A versenyjog és a digitális piacok monopóliumai

Alkalmas-e a versenyjog a digitális piacok versenyszempontú megregulázására?

Szerzők

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.59851/imr.12.1.3

Kulcsszavak:

versenyjog, digitális piacok szabályozása, szankciók

Absztrakt

A tanulmány áttekinti, hogy a versenyjog, a versenyjogi szabályok alkalmazása és a versenypolitika céljai hogyan képesek szabályozni a digitális szolgáltatásokat nyújtó vállalkozások piaci magatartását. A szabályok és azok alkalmazási lehetőségének elemzése során – felhasználva a közgazdaságtan eredményeit is – a tanulmány bemutatja, hogy mely területeken szükséges a versenyjogi jogalkalmazásnak fejlődnie és van-e szükség ágazati jellegű szabályozásra.

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Megjelent

2023-07-11

Hogyan kell idézni

Pál, S. (2023). A versenyjog és a digitális piacok monopóliumai: Alkalmas-e a versenyjog a digitális piacok versenyszempontú megregulázására?. In Medias Res, 12(1), 35–52. https://doi.org/10.59851/imr.12.1.3

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