Competition law and monopolies in digital markets
Is competition law suitable for regulating digital markets?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.59851/imr.12.1.3Keywords:
competition law, regulation of digital markets, sanctionsAbstract
The paper reviews how competition law, the application of competition rules and the objectives of competition policy can regulate the market behaviour of digital service providers. In the analysis of the rules and their potential application, the paper also draws on the results of economics to show in which areas competition law enforcement needs to improve and whether sector-specific regulation is needed.
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