Assessment of the punishable expressions affecting public affairs that are objectively suitable for damaging honor

With particular regard to the evaluation of intention of insulting

Abstract

After the constitutional revolution in criminal law the adjudication of mainfestation in public affairs changed in Hungary. The Resolution of the Constitutional Court No. 36/1994. (VI. 24.) was amended the defamation’s and slander’s protected legal interest. From this Resolution of the Constitutional Court the examination of fundamental right requirements are necessary to determine this two criminals, but it distanced the different concept of honor appearing in the scope of acts and the protected legal interest from each other. The Supreme Court’s practice of the past decade consistently followed this duality, however, the resolution of the Supreme Court No. Bfv.378/2022/8. raises the possibility of change. Reviewing the legal practice, it became questionable whether all the fundamental rights requirements really apply. The two main issues of legal practice with fundamental rights implications are judging the intention of insulting and the unprofitable justification in the case of statements of fact. How do criminal courts assess expressions of opinion with the intention of insulting? Is the failure to pruve the truth ample to establish the criminal liability in the case of statement of fact concerning public affairs? The article examines these issues concerning freedom of expression.